Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze whether the qualitative dimension of the ownership structure, in particular the family identity of the controlling shareholder, infl uences the optimal configuration of the Board of Directors, as well as the effect that such configuration has on firm value creation. The econometric technique used, the system estimator of the Generalized Method of Moments, applied to a panel of Spanish family and non-family listed companies in the period 2001-2007, allows us to solve the traditional problem of endogeneity existing in studies of corporate governance. The results show how the need for advising and monitoring depends on the family nature of the controlling shareholder and, therefore, the optimal structure of the Board of Directors differs between the two classes of companies under consideration. Among the main conclusions, we found that, contrary to the widespread believe, smaller and more independent boards are not always more efficient.
Authorship: García-Ramos R., Olalla M.G.O.,
Fuente: Revista Española de Financiacion y Contabilidad, Volume 40, Issue 149, Pages 35 - 64, January-March 2011
Publisher: AECA
Year of publication: 2011
No. of pages: 30
Publication type: Article
DOI: 10.1080/02102412.2011.10779697
ISSN: 0210-2412